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CRIMINAL LAW
BIGHT TO COUNSEL AT POSTINDICTMENT CORPOREAL VIEWING DOES NOT
EXTEND TO SUBSEQUENT INTERVIEW OF WITNESS HELD OUTSIDE
DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE
United States v. Tolliver
The sixth amendment guarantees the right to counsel' at all
"critical stages" following the commencement of a criminal pro-
ceeding. 2 One such "critical stage" is the postindictment, pretrial
lineup, in which a suspect is displayed before an eyewitness for
purposes of identification.3 Although the Supreme Court has held
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI provides that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Initially, the right to
counsel was held applicable only in felony cases. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65
(1932). The right was later extended to all prosecutions which could result in imprisonment
for any term. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). For an overview of the right
to counsel, see Note, Right to Counsel at Lineups-A Pro Forma Right?, 7 SuFFoLK L. REv.
587 (1973); Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in
Effective Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 65 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Police Proceedings].
2 In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932), the Supreme Court stated that the right
to counsel extends to "perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . ., the time of
[thel arraignment until the beginning of [the] trial, when consultation, thorough going
investigation and preparation [are] vitally important." Since Powell, the Supreme Court
expressly has held certain specific stages to be critical. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S.
220 (1977) (show-up at preliminary hearing); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (prelim-
inary hearing to determine if evidence sufficient to present case to grand jury); Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentencing hearing); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per
curiam) (preliminary hearing); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraignment). In
addition, the Court has noted that changes in "law enforcement machinery" may require an
expansion of the "critical stage." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
The sixth amendment right to counsel is waivable under certain circumstances. In John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court ruled that to establish that a defendant
had waived his right to counsel, the prosecution must bear the burden of showing "an inten-
tional relinquishment. . . of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464. The Court has continued
to impose this standard in assessing the effectiveness of a waiver. See, e.g., Brewer v. Wil-
liams, 430 U.S. 387, 402-04 (1977); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-38 (1973);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967). For a discussion of the standards governing
waiver of the right to counsel, see Note, The Right to Counsel and the Strict Waiver Standard,
57 NEB. L. REv. 543 (1978).
2 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967). See also Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). Even where the right to counsel is not a consideration, a pretrial
identification procedure that is unnecessarily suggestive may violate a suspect's basic right
to due process of law. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). See generally Quinn, In Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of The
Eyewitness Identification Cases, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 135 (1970); Read, Lawyers at Lineups:
Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 339 (1969); Sobel,
Assailing The Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the Abuse of Pre-trial
Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 261 (1971); Note, Pretrial Identifica-
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that an attorney is necessary to protect the accused from prejudice
resulting from suggestive identification procedures,4 it has never
defined clearly the scope of a suspect's right to counsel during a
lineup. Recently, in United States v. Tolliver,5 the Second Circuit
held that the right to counsel at a postindictment corporeal viewing
does not extend to a subsequent interview held outside of the sus-
pect's presence at which the witness communicates the identifica-
tion to the prosecutor.'
Using information supplied by an eyewitness, police appre-
hended Philip Tolliver in connection with a bank robbery perpe-
trated some 15 minutes earlier.7 At the suggestion of the trial judge,
a pretrial lineup was conducted in which Tolliver and five other men
were displayed to the eyewitness, James Zima.8 Tolliver's counsel
tion Procedures-Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. Rv.
779 (1971); Note, Extension of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel-The Road From
Wade to Ash, 7 U. RICH. L. Rav. 139 (1972). It should be noted that the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination is not infringed when a suspect is required to participate
in a lineup. In fact, since the fifth amendment privilege extends only to communications, a
lineup participant may be required to wear certain clothing, speak, or assume a unique
position. Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). The Wade Court noted that reports
of police practices
reveal numerous instances of suggestive procedures, for example, that all in the
lineup but the suspect were known to the identifying witness, that the other partici-
pants . . . were grossly dissimilar in appearance to the suspect, that only the
suspect was required to wear distinctive clothing . . ., that the suspect [was]
pointed out before or during a lineup, and that the participants. . . [were] asked
to try on an article of clothing which fit only the suspect.
Id. at 232-33 (footnote omitted); see Eisenberg & Feustal, Pretrial Identification: AnAttempt
To Articulate Constitutional Criteria, 58 MAMQ. L. Rav. 659, 669 (1975); Comment, Pretrial
Identification Confrontations, 45 Miss. L.J. 489, 497-508 (1974); Police Proceedings, supra
note 1, at 79-81. The danger of misidentification resulting from such suggestive police tactics
may be compounded by the witness' reluctance to inform authorities of his mistakes once an
initial identification has been made. The result is a "freezing effect," whereby "the issue of
identity [isi determined there and then, before trial." WiLLIAMs & HAMMELMANN, IDENTIFICA-
MON PARADES pt. I, at 479, 482 (1963). This "freezing effect" was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Wade. 388 U.S. at 229. For compilations of case histories illustrating the dangers
inherent in eyewitness identification, see E. BocHARD, CoNvICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); F.
FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANzETTI (1927); O'Connor, "That's The Man": A
Sobering Study of Eyewitness Identification and the Polygraph, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1
(1974). See also Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977).
569 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 728.
Id. at 725-26. The eyewitness' curiousity was aroused when his car was "overtaken by
a speeding green Pontiac." Id. at 725. He watched as the Pontiac came to a sudden halt and
its occupants ran out and entered a white Cadillac parked nearby. After following the Cadil-
lac for a few blocks and noting its license plate number, the eyewitness contacted police
officers who relayed the information to field units in the vicinity. Id.
1 Id. at 726.
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was present at the lineup and made no objection to the manner in
which it was conducted.' Zima, whose name was withheld from
Tolliver's attorney, was instructed by the prosecution not to utter
any identifying statements during the lineup. ° Over an objection
from Tolliver's counsel, Zima was escorted from the lineup room
and questioned in private concerning the identity of the driver of the
getaway car." Tolliver's attorney subsequently moved to suppress
the identification on the ground that he had been excluded from the
interview. 2 The motion was denied13 after the trial court conducted
a suppression hearing. 4 Tolliver was thereafter convicted of bank
robbery and conspiracy. 5
Affirming Tolliver's conviction,"6 the Second Circuit ruled that,
Id.
Id.
Id. Testimony at a subsequent hearing revealed that Zima initially identified a lineup
participant who was not Tolliver as the one who looked most like the individual he had seen
driving the getaway car. It was only after a second viewing, during which each person in the
lineup alternately donned a pair of sunglasses, that Zima was able to identify Tolliver beyond
"a benefit of a doubt." Id. The second identification also was made outside the presence of
Tolliver's counsel.
12 Id.
11 Id. Although the trial judge did not find the attorney's exclusion from the post viewing
interview unlawful, he did express reservations concerning the use of the procedure. Id.
1 Id. Hearings to suppress eyewitness identifications were instituted after the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Wade Court recognized
that a significant element of the right to counsel would be ignored if a tainted pretrial lineup
identification were suppressed while the witness remained free to make an in-court identifica-
tion of the defendant based solely on his observations during the lineup. Id. at 241. Accord-
ingly, the Wade Court concluded that a witness who was exposed to a tainted pretrial identifi-
cation procedure may not make an in-court identification unless his testimony is based upon
independent information. Id. Factors to be considered in determining whether an indepen-
dent basis for the in-court identification exists include the prior opportunity of the witness
to observe the criminal act, any difference between a pretrial description of the suspect and
his actual appearance, the time lapse between the crime and the pretrial identification
procedure, any identification of another person prior to the lineup, failure to identify the
defendant on prior occasions, and the conduct of the lineup itself. Id.
11 569 F.2d at 725. Tolliver was convicted of bank robbery by force and intimidation, see
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976), and conspiracy to rob a bank, see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
" In addition to upholding the trial court's determination at the suppression hearing, the
Second Circuit affirmed the denial of Tolliver's motion to set aside the conviction on the
ground that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 569 F.2d at 731. The motion
was based on his attorney's failure to move for a mistrial when his codefendant pleaded guilty,
her failure to call the codefendant as a witness and her failure to cross-examine Zima. Id. at
730. The Second Circuit, however, found that the attorney's conduct did not constitute a
deprivation of Tolliver's right to effective legal assistance, even under the "liberal standard
that 'a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as
his diligent conscientious advocate.'" Id., at 731 (quoting United States v. DeCoster, 487
F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to counsel includes effective and
competent legal assistance. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McMann v. Ri-
chardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United
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in the context of postindictment lineups, the "actual confrontation
is the only 'critical stage' requiring the presence of counsel."' 7 Judge
Gurfein, who authored the unanimous opinion,'5 stressed that the
primary purpose of requiring an attorney's presence during a lineup
is to miminize prejudice and preserve evidence of any improper
suggestiveness "inherent in the actual confrontation."'" Noting that
the Second Circuit previously had held that photographic identifi-
cation procedures may be conducted without the presence of an
attorney, 0 Judge Gurfein reasoned that the postviewing identifica-
tion interview in Tolliver need not have been conducted in the pres-
ence of defendant's counsel.2' The court, however, went on to ob-
serve that devices for making a verbatim recording of such an inter-
view are readily available.2 2 The court reasoned that, although the
confrontation ceases when the defendant no longer faces the wit-
States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). The courts
generally utilize one of two standards in determining whether an attorney's assistance has
been "effective." The "farce and mockery" standard, first articulated in Diggs v. Welch, 148
F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), is presently applied in four
circuits. See United States v. Daniels, 568 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Grismore,
546 F.2d 844, 850-51 (10th Cir. 1976); Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1974); Root
v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 866 (1965). Relying on the
Supreme Court's opinion in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), however, most
courts have concluded that the effectiveness of counsel should be measured by "the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. at 771; see Cooper v. Fitzharris,
551 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977); Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 1976); Pinnell v. Cauthron,
540 F.2d 938, 939 (8th Cir. 1976); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc). Although the Second Circuit traditionally has adhered
to the older "farce and mockery" standard, see, e.g., United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192,
202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977), several recent cases indicate that it may be
moving toward the more liberal "normal competence" approach. See United States v. Wil-
liams, 575 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Tolliver, 569 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Daniels, 568 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Medico,
557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977). For discussions of the history of the right to effective assistance
of counsel, see Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. Rv. 1 (1973);
Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation As a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief
in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rav. 289 (1964); Note, The Constitutional Mandate of Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel: The Duty To Investigate, 6 HoFSTR L. REv. 245 (1977).
11 569 F.2d 728 (citing United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 900 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 852 (1969)); see notes 37-39 and accompanying text infra. The court observed that
although the Supreme Court has recognized a right to counsel at a post indictment lineup, it
has never determined when the "critical" aspect of the lineup actually ends. 569 F.2d at 727.
11 The Second Circuit panel consisted of Judges Gurfein, Feinberg and Oakes.
12 569 F.2d at 727 (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir.
1970)).
21 See United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969);
notes 37-39 and accompanying text infra.
22 569 F.2d at 728.
2 Id.
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ness, a recording of the subsequent interview "should be considered
as an extension of the line-up." 23 Accordingly, the court ruled that
in future cases a videotape or taperecording of the postlineup inter-
view 24 must be made available to a defendant prior to a pretrial
suppression hearing. 2s
Turning to the issue of the concealment of the eyewitness'
identity from defense counsel, the Second Circuit drew an analogy
to the accepted practice of withholding the identity of a government
informant."5 Noting that discovery of evidence is inherently limited
2 Id.
21 The American Law Institute has advocated the use of videotape in pretrial identifica-
tion proceedings. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES § 160.4 (1975), provides
in pertinent part:
(2) A visual and sound record shall be made of any identification procedure in-
volving hearing the voice of, or viewing a person in custody ....
(3) A [written or sound] record shall be made of any statement made by or to
the witness in the course of the procedure ...
(5) The written or sound records . . . shall include any objections, suggestions or
observations of the person to be identified or his counsel as well as any action taken
in response to such objection or suggestion.
Accord, ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2.1 (Ap-
proved Draft 1970). Although it is relatively new to the courts, videotaping has been suggested
as a viable alternative to existing recording methods. See Murray, The Use of Videotape In
the Preparation and Trial of Lawsuits, 11 FORUM 1152 (1976); Comment, Videotape In The
Courts: Its Use and Potential, 3 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 279 (1973). It has been noted
that the use of advances in recordation could produce substantial savings in both cost and
time by eliminating costly stenographic services and bulky transcripts, and minimizing the
need for extensive cross-examination before and during trial. See Comment, Videotape: Pre-
corded Trials- A Procedure for Judicial Expediency, 3 OHIO N.L. REV. 849, 890-96 (1976);
Note, The Role of Videotape in The Criminal Court, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1107, 1123-26 (1976).
One commentator has argued that strict compliance with the principles articulated in United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), "require[s] extraordinary devices such as . . .imple-
mentation of electronic procedures like audio and visual monitoring." Decker, The Demise
of Procedural Protections in Laywitness Identifications in Federal Court: Who is the Culprit?,
9 LOYOLA L.J. 335, 351 (1978).
2 569 F.2d at 728.
21 Id. at 729. The Tolliver court recognized that its analogy between a "secret informer"
and an ordinary citizen who witnesses a crime was incomplete since an informant's identity
is protected, at least in part, in order to ensure his continuing usefulness as a source of
information. Id.
Under the "informer's privilege" doctrine, the government has the authority to withhold
the identity of those who supply it with information concerning criminal activities. Scher v.
United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Vogel v.
Gruas, 110 U.S. 311 (1884). Discussing the scope of the privilege, in Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1957), the Supreme Court stated that an approach balancing "the public interest
in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense"
should be followed. Id. at 62. Although a proper balance depends on the facts of each case,
the Court indicated that certain factors such as "the crime charged, the possible defenses,
landi the possible significance of the informer's testimony" should be considered. Id. The
Second Circuit utilized this approach in United States v. Hyatt, 565 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1977).
It should be noted that once the identity of the witness is disclosed, the "informer's privilege"
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in criminal prosecutions, 27 Judge Gurfein concluded that the need
to protect a witness' safety "outweighs total discovery as a prelimi-
nary requirement of fair trial."' While he recognized the recurring
danger of misidentification, Judge Gurfein stated that "there must
be some ultimate reliance on the ethics of the prosecutor. 2  The
court acknowledged that "there is some danger that misplaced zeal
can, consciously or unconsciously, steer a witness to a desired iden-
tification. ' 3" Nevertheless, the court reasoned, the recording re-
quirement established in Tolliver, coupled with a requirement that
the prosecution obtain an ex parte direction from the trial judge
permitting the witness' identity to be withheld, would provide ade-
quate safeguards and minimize the possibility of prejudice.3' Al-
though such procedures were not followed in Tolliver, the court
found the error harmless under the facts in the case. 32
The principles underlying the judicially created right to counsel
at pretrial lineups were first enunciated in United States v. Wade. 33
Concerned with the possibility of erroneous identifications, the
Wade Court concluded that an attorney's presence at lineup would
insure that the lineup is conducted in an unprejudicial manner and
guarantee the preservation of information necessary to conduct a
meaningful cross-examination of the identifying witness at trial.3 4
ceases to exist and the prosecution no longer has the right to prevent the defense from having
access to the trial witness. See id. at 232. See generally IBM v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41-44
(2d Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the "informer's privilege," see Comment, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Criminal Defendants: The Identity of Informers, 8 J. MARSHALL L. J. 401
(1975).
569 F.2d at 728; see FED. R. CriM. PRoc. 16(a)(z).
569 F.2d at 729 (emphasis omitted).
2Id.
:'Id.
' Id. at 730.
2 Id. The references in Tolliver to "harmless error" are somewhat confusing. Compare
id. at 728 with id. at 730. Initially, the court indicated that the failure to record the interview
was merely "harmless error" without indicating whether the error was of constitutional mag-
nitude. Id. at 728. Later in the opinion, however, the Second Circuit applied the test for
harmless constitutional error articulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Under
the Chapman test, a trial error which violates the defendant's rights need not result in the
reversal of a conviction if it is shown "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error. . . did not
contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. at 24. Unfortunately, the Tolliver opinion leaves
unclear whether it was the failure to disclose the identifying witness' name or the failure to
record the post lineup interview, or both, that had triggered the application of the Chapman
analysis. See generally Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman
v. California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1969); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L.
Rav. 83 (1967).
= 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
3' Id. at 236. The Wade Court's primary concern was that a suspect compelled to partici-
pate in a lineup without the presence of his attorney may lose his "most basic right as a
criminal defendant-his right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against him might be
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:306
Although this reasoning could have served as the basis for applying
Wade whenever an identification procedure gave rise to the possibil-
ity of prejudice,15 such an expansive view was dramatically cur-
tailed3 18 when the Supreme Court refused to extend the right to
counsel to photograph identification procedures in United States v.
Ash.37 The Ash Court concluded that a "critical stage" requiring the
presence of counsel exists only when the defendant is actually con-
fronted with the government's law enforcement machinery38 and the
absence of an attorney would prejudice his ability to defend himself
at trial.39 Once an analogy between a photographic identification
meaningfully cross-examined." Id. at 224. Noting that it would be difficult for the defendant
or the witness to detect prejudicial conditions and reconstruct at trial what transpired at the
lineup, the Wade Court concluded that an attorney's presence is necessary to insure that the
defendant is not placed at an unfair disadvantage in the preparation of his defense. Id. at
236-37 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
1 Some courts concluded that the Wade right to counsel was applicable to identifications
made from photographic displays. E.g. United States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
rev'd, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); accord, Cox v. State, 219 So. 2d 762 (Fla. App. 1969); People v.
Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d
704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738
(1970). See also Note, Pretrial Photographic Identifications - A "Critical Stage" of Criminal
Proceedings?, 21 SYAcusE L. REv. 1235 (1970); Comment, Photo-Identifications: A Right To
Counsel?, 7 CAL. W.L. REv. 161 (1970).
11 The scope of the Wade holding was first curtailed in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972), wherein the Court held that the right to counsel attaches only at lineups conducted
after the commencement of formal adversary proceedings. The Kirby decision was viewed by
many as a severe constriction of the Wade holding, since in practice most lineups are con-
ducted prior to indictment. See, e.g., N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACr-
[CAL PROBLEMs 30 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 163 n.56 (1972).
One commentator, however, argued that the Kirby decision would have the positive effect of
encouraging early release of innocent persons by providing an incentive to law enforcement
personnel to conduct lineups immediately after arrest. See Decker, supra note 24, at 342.
Moreover, expeditious procedures would result in fewer misidentifications since the witness
could utilize his "fresh recollection." Id. See generally Grano, Kirby Biggers and Ash: Do Any
Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against The Danger of Convicting The Innocent?, 72
MICH. L. REv. 717 (1974); Note, The Lineup's Lament: Kirby v. Illinois, 22 DE PAUL L. REv.
660 (1973).
7 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
1- Significantly, the procedures which have been recognized as "critical stages" all in-
volve the physical presence of the accused. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1971)
(show-up); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing); Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineups); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile hearing); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1956) (preliminary
hearing); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam) (arraignment); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraign-
ment). One commentator has noted that "the defendant's presence is a sine qua non of
confrontations; the sixth amendment right to counsel does not extend to procedures that do
not personally involve the defendant." See Grano, supra note 36, at 761 n.276.
" 413 U.S. at 315-17. The Ash Court reasoned that a photographic display was not a
"trial-like adversary confrontation" between the witness and agents of the government where
the accused could be "misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his
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and a postviewing interview is drawn, it seems clear that the Ash
reasoning would apply to the issue in Tolliver, precluding any abso-
lute right to the presence of defense counsel at an identification
interview conducted after a lineup."
It is submitted, however, that the postviewing interview is dis-
tinguishable from other situations in which witnesses are examined
outside the defendant's presence. In the case of a photographic iden-
professional adversary." Id. at 317. In addition, the Supreme Court noted:
None of the classical analyses of the assistance to be given by counsel, Justice
Sutherland's in Powell v. Alabama . . . and Justice Black's in Johnson v. Zerbst
.. .and Gideon v. Wainwright. . .suggests that counsel must be present when
the prosecution is interrogating witnesses in the defendant's absence even when, as
here, the defendant is under arrest; counsel is rather to be provided to prevent the
defendant himself from falling into traps devised by a lawyer on the other side and
to see to it that all available defenses are proffered. Many other aspects of the
prosecution's interviews with a victim or a witness to a crime afford just as much
opportunity for undue suggestion as the display of photographs; so, too, do the
defense's interviews, notably with the alibi witnesses.
Id. at 316-17. A number of commentators, however, have argued that photographic identifi-
cation procedures present a substantial danger of prejudice. E.g., WALL, EYE-WrrNESS IDEN-
TIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 66-89 (1965); Comment, Photographic Identification: The
Hidden Persuader, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 408 (1970); Comment, Criminal Procedure-Photo Iden-
tifications-Stovall Prospectivity Rule Invoked to Avoid Extension of Right to Counsel, 43
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019 (1968).
"' Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973), several courts determined that the right to counsel does not extend to a post lineup
interview conducted outside the defendant's presence. In United States v. Cunningham, 423
F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970), the Fourth Circuit found no infringement of a sixth amendment
right although the defendant's attorney was ejected from the post viewing interview following
an argument with the prosecutor. The Cunningham court reasoned that the defendant had
no right to have his attorney present, since the potential for prejudice in a postviewing
interview is no greater than it is in any other pretrial interview with a witness. Id. at 1274;
see United States v. Wilcox, 507 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975).
Similarly, in United States v. Banks, 485 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 987
(1974), the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's right to counsel was not abridged where
the defense attorney observed the lineup preparation and execution and was able to interview
the witnesses after the prosecution questioned them in a separate room. 485 F.2d at 548.
Significantly, the Banks court declined to establish a per se rule, opting instead for an
analysis of the issue on a case-by-case basis. The Fifth Circuit stated:
We emphasize that similar procedures might require a different result if coun-
sel is denied the opportunity to reconstruct all elements of the lineup and related
agent-witness interviews, or if any witness indicates suggestive statements or ac-
tions by prosecution agents while counsel for the accused is excluded.
Id. at 548-49. Faced with a similar situation, the Ninth Circuit, in Doss v. United States, 431
F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1970), held that the sixth amendment only required that defense counsel
observe his client and the lineup proceedings, not that he be present at lineup or post lineup
interviews. Id. at 604. See also United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 971 (1977); see United States v. Gholston, 437 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1971). It should
be noted that the Second Circuit's decision in Tolliver seems to represent an extention of the
reasoning in these cases, since in Tolliver defense counsel was not permitted access to the
identifying witness immediately after the postlineup interview. See 569 F.2d at 728.
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tification, as in the case of a witness providing other types of infor-
mation, the entire procedure may be conducted in the absence of
the suspect. A postlineup interview, in contrast, is completely de-
pendent upon the initial corporeal viewing and may be regarded as
the third phase of a continuous process consisting of suspect presen-
tation, recognition by the witness and verbalization of the identifi-
cation." Such a wholistic view of corporeal viewing procedures was
at least implicitly recognized by the Tolliver court when it charac-
terized the postviewing interview as an "extension of the lineup.1m
In holding that the right to counsel does not extend to postview-
ing interviews, while requiring such interviews to be preserved on
tape, the Second Circuit appears to have been seeking a middle
ground, balancing the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial
against the government's interest in protecting witnesses and main-
taining an efficient law enforcement system. The constitutional
basis for such an approach, however, is difficult to discern. By re-
quiring a recording and mandating that it be made available to
defense counsel prior to the suppression hearing in most cases, the
court would seem to be applying the broader Wade theory of consti-
tutional protection to postlineup interviews. 3 Yet, if the Wade ra-
tionale is applicable, there would appear to be no principled basis
for excluding counsel from the interview. On the other hand, if the
Tolliver holding is not based on constitutional mandate, its require-
ment that the defense attorney be afforded pretrial access to tapes
of witness interviews seems questionable in light of the provisions
of the Jencks Act, which precludes discovery of witnesses' state-
ments until after they have testified at trial."
" The notion that a lineup is not complete until a verbal identification is made was
advanced in United States v. Daniels, 506 F.2d 791, 795 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring),
aff'd, 506 F.2d 1053 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 967 (1975). See also United States ex rel.
Burton v. Cuyler, 439 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The Daniels majority, however,
did not conclusively decide the issue, since it found that the lineup witness' in-court identifi-
cation had a basis independent of the lineup. 506 F.2d at 793. The California Supreme Court's
ruling in People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 478 P.2d 942, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971), see note 45
infra, also suggests that the "critical stage" does not necessarily end with the termination of
the viewing phase of the lineup.
569 F.2d at 728.
" See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
" 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976); see also FED. R. CRiM. PRoc. 16 (a)(2) (1976). The Jencks Act,
which outlines discovery procedures, provides in pertinent part:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to an agent
of the Government shall be the subject of [subpoena], discovery, or inspection
until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (a) (1976) (emphasis added). The term "statement" is defined to include
verbatim recordings of oral statements made by witnesses to the prosecution. Id. § 3500(e)(2).
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Despite its ambiguity, Tolliver may be viewed as both a refine-
ment and a revitalization of the liberal Wade approach to the sixth
amendment right to counsel. The decision also exemplifies the logi-
cal difficulties that courts encounter in attempting to apply the
sixth amendment guarantees in the context of modem suspect iden-
tification techniques.45 It is hoped that the Supreme Court will di-
rect its attention to this issue in the near future and provide clear
guidelines for the courts to use in analyzing right to counsel ques-
tions in cases involving identification procedures.
John E. Ryan
4 Recently, in a case decided after Tolliver, the Eighth Circuit held that there is no right
to counsel at post viewing interviews. United States v. Bierey, 588 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1978).
The Bierey court reasoned that the identification was already made at the lineup and the
subsequent interview was necessary only to confirm this fact. Id. at 625. Although the result
was the same, the route followed in Bierey differs significantly from that taken by the Tolliver
court, see notes 19-25 and accompanying text supra, and the other circuits which have
considered the issue. See note 40 supra. It should be noted that the courts are not unanimous
in concluding that the right to counsel does not extend to postviewing interviews. The Third
Circuit has not addressed the question directly but has hinted that it might find that the right
to counsel attaches to a postlineup interview. See United States v. Daniels, 506 F.2d 791,
793, aff'd, 506 F.2d 1053 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 967 (1975); United States v.
Lewis, 456 F.2d 404, 407 (3d Cir. 1972). Moreover, in a decision discussed in the Daniels
opinion, 506 F.2d at 795, the California Supreme Court stressed the inherent danger of
suggestion by law enforcement officials and concluded that counsel should be able to recon-
struct not only "the moment of viewing alone, but rather the whole procedure by which [a
suspect] is identified." People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 856, 478 P.2d 942, 944, 92 Cal. Rptr.
6, 8 (1971) (4-3 decision). But see Bellew v. Gunn, 424 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1976). (Williams
analysis rejected). Two other state courts have addressed the issue of right to counsel at a
postlineup interview and reached opposite results. Compare People v. McDonald, 23 Ill. App.
3d 86, 318 N.E.2d 489 (1974), aff'd, 62 Ill. 2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489 (1975) with State v. Favro,
5 Wash. App. 311, 487 P.2d 261 (1971). In McDonald, the court concluded that Wade man-
dated not only counsel's presence at the lineup itself but at the actual identification as well.
23 Ill. App. 3d at 89, 318 N.E.2d at 492. In Favro, the court found no right to counsel at the
postlineup interview since the defendant was not physically present at that proceeding. 5
Wash App. at 312, 487 P.2d at 263.
